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Abstract
We exploit an exogenous price increase by about 10% for architectural services to answer the question how
price regulation affects income inequality and service quality. Using individual-level data from the German
microcensus for the years 2006 to 2012, we find a significant reform effect of 8% on personal net income
for self-employed architects and construction engineers. This group moved from the second lowest to the
highest quintile of the net income distribution. This increase in inequality is associated with a deterioration
of service quality. The reform reduced average scores of a peer ranking for architects by 18%.
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1. Introduction
Regulation typically comes in two forms: entry regulation and price regulation. Both represent a severe mar-
ket intervention (e.g., Koumenta and Pagliero 2018; Kleiner and Krueger 2013, 2010). The main argument
in favour of regulation is to provide a minimum level of quality. A layman is often not able to objectively
judge the quality of services provided by professionals like architects and engineers (Friedman and Kuznets
1954). This may result in prices that do not reflect the true valuation of consumers. Therefore, prices for ex-
perience or credence goods are often fixed by law. Such price regulations are particularly prevalent among
the so-called liberal professions (lawyers, physicians, tax advisors, etc.) in many European countries.1 How-
ever, they may have unintended effects on the labour market. In particular, these regulations may result in
∗Department of Economics, Universita¨t Hohenheim, 70593 Stuttgart, Germany (e-mail: davud.rostam-afschar@uni-
hohenheim.de).
†Department of Economics, Universita¨t Tu¨bingen, Nauklerstraße 47, 72074 Tu¨bingen, Germany (e-mail: k.strohmaier@uni-
tuebingen.de).
1A non-exhaustive list of examples shows that binding price regulation exists for services of accountants in Germany and
Greece, lawyers in Austria, Germany, Greece, and Italy, notaries in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and
Spain, architects in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg, engineers in Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and pharmacists in
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
(Paterson et al. 2007).
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FIGURE 1
Distributions of Monthly Net Income of Self-Employed and Employees
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Notes: This figure plots the income distributions (monthly net income) separately for employees (in red) and
self-employed individuals who have their own employees (in blue) for the year 2009. The vertical lines docu-
ment the average net income for architects, engineers, lawyers and tax advisor.
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2006-2012).
higher income inequality. Evidence for the US, presented in Smith et al. (2017), showed that firms owned
by the top 1-0.1% income earners are single-establishment firms in professional services (e.g., consultants,
lawyers, skilled tradespeople) or health services (e.g., physicians, dentists). Figure 1 shows that also in
Germany, the self-employed individuals—which are very often exposed to professional regulation—have
higher incomes compared to employees. Evidence on how regulation affects income inequality and service
quality is of primary importance for our understanding of economic behaviour and for the organisation of
markets. This paper contributes first evidence on the association between regulation and income inequality
on the one hand and regulation and service quality on the other hand. In particular, we provide an answer to
the question whether business owners used extra revenue generated by an exogenous price increase to raise
wages of employees, to invest in quality or to increase their own incomes.
To answer our key questions, we use the unique setting of architects and construction engineers in
Germany as a natural experiment in which the price level was increased in the year 2009. This price hike
was exogenous, since prices were not determined by demand and supply but instead by price regulation
(called “Honorarordnung fu¨r Architekten und Ingenieure”, HOAI), which sets both price ceilings and floors
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for all architectural services offered by architects and construction engineers during the entire period of
observation. At the same time, the actual market price was unknown and could have lied always below the
price stipulated by the legislation. This is clearly the case in the extreme case of very strong information
asymmetries, where the market would fail to agree on a price above zero (Akerlof 1970). Therefore, we
contrast the income distribution of regulated architects and construction engineers to that of their unregulated
peers, i.e. we use “all other engineers” operating in markets where prices are determined by supply and
demand as a control group. The HOAI is currently subject to a heated debate. The European Commission
claims that this strict price regulation is not compliant with the European Union Services Directive (Directive
2006/123/EC) and therefore opened an infringement case against Germany. In the past, these fixed prices
were changed by amendments to the HOAI. In particular, prices increased on average by about 10% from
2009 onwards. This drastic change is the natural experiment that we exploit to study the reform effects on
income, income inequality, and measures of service quality.
We estimate the causal effects of the reform using various Difference-in-Differences (DD) models on
two datasets. The main analysis is based on individual-level data from the German microcensus for the
years 2006 to 2012 that provides information on treatment status, personal net income, weekly hours worked
and further relevant individual-level characteristics. In a first step, to investigate how the exogenous price
increase affected incomes, we estimate a linear DD model using self-reported data on the individual-level
asking for profession and industry to define the treatment group that includes all architects and construction
engineers who work either as self-employed or employees in firms that experienced the price increase.
The control group comprises all other engineers (self-employed or employees) where prices are determined
by market forces. We find that incomes of self-employed architects and construction engineers increased
significantly by 8.0% while incomes for employees did not change at all. This implies that the full share of
the price hike ended up in the business owners’ pockets and that there is no evidence that any part of the
extra profits affected employees’ incomes.
Second, we estimate multinomial logit DD models with maximum likelihood for the quintiles of the
personal net income distribution of all self-employed individuals. The results indicate that the probability
to belong to the second lowest 20% and the mid 20% of the personal net income distribution decreased
due to the HOAI reform by 5 percentage points, while the probability to stay in the second highest and
highest 20% increased correspondingly. This is consistent with a novel alternative estimation strategy: We
fit the multinomial logit DD model for all engineers who were not subject to price regulations both before
and after the reform and for architects and construction engineers who were subject to the regulation but
only before the reform. We then perform out-of-sample predictions with our estimates to simulate what
part of the income distribution an individual architect or construction engineer would have belonged to if
the reform would not have occurred. The idea is identical to the usual DD approach except for the fact
that we do not use post-treatment information for the predictions. The main advantage is that the average
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treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is much easier to obtain in non-linear models. A comparison with the
actually observed frequencies in the respective income classes shows that the probability to stay in the top
two quintiles increased by about 5 percentage points.
Finally, we show how service quality changed due to the reform. Using a well-known office ranking
within the architectural profession, we find that the exogenous price increase did not have the intended
positive quality effects. In contrast, by using the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) following Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003), the reform had a negative effect on service quality with a significant decrease of two
score points within that ranking which corresponds to a decrease by 18%.
This article is organised as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief overview of the literature on regulation
and quality. Section 3 provides institutional details on the HOAI reform. We describe the dataset in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5, we present the empirical strategy and report our results. Section 6 concludes. Additional
information on background information and robustness tests can be found in our Online Appendix.
2. Regulation, Quality, and Inequality: Theory and Existing Evidence
Our study lies at the intersection of labour economics, law, and industrial organisation and is thus related
to studies on the labour and product market effects of regulation. Although we focus on a particular kind
of regulation, namely price regulation, our approach is close to that of studies on occupational licensing
(Kleiner 2000).
With respect to product market effects, recent evidence (e.g., Pagliero 2013, 2011) suggests that entry
requirements create monopoly rents within an occupation. On the other hand, theoretical models show that
regulation can be welfare increasing since it guarantees a minimum level of quality if quality is uncertain
(Pigou 1938; Akerlof 1970; Leland 1979). However, there is few empirical evidence for quality or produc-
tivity effects of regulation. While Rostam-Afschar (2014) finds that less entry regulation in the German
crafts sector mainly resulted in new entries by untrained workers, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) find few ef-
fects of tougher regulation on malpractice insurance rates or complaints to state licensing boards. In this
light, the case of the HOAI is particularly interesting to study, since the German Monopolies Commission
(2006) claims that the introduction of this price regulation in 1977 was not a response to actual problems
with quality in the construction sector. Still, the legislation was justified to shut down price competition
such that firms may focus on competition in quality.
There is more evidence on the effects of entry regulation on incomes and wages; and this evidence
consistently finds a positive, economically significant effect. For instance, Koumenta and Pagliero (2018)
show that entry regulation is associated with 4% higher hourly wages for the European Union. Gittleman
and Kleiner (2016) find a somewhat larger effect for the US. We add to this literature by showing how price
regulation affects incomes, and—since labour supply of architects and engineers is quite inelastic—hourly
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wages. Moreover, we are able to show how the price increase is split in wage increases for employees and
self-employed individuals.
Finally, our analysis contributes to the literature on income inequality and wealth inequality. Though
Fossen et al. (2017) show that entry regulation could be an important determinant of the wealth concen-
tration, we leave it to future research to investigate this for our case because our data does not provide
information on wealth. However, the data provides a measure on personal net income, which allows us to
study income inequality. It is well known that wage increases in the form of performance pay—intended to
boost output quality—increase the income dispersion (Bryan and Bryson 2016). However, the role of regu-
lation with the same objective is still unclear. While Kleiner and Krueger (2013) and Gittleman and Kleiner
(2016) do not find significant effects of entry regulation on the wage dispersion in the US, Koumenta and
Pagliero (2018) provide evidence that licensing disproportionately benefits those at the top of the income
distribution. We add to this literature by focusing on price regulation and applying methods in a novel way
to measure the effect on inequality.
3. Regulation of Architects and Engineers and the HOAI-Reform 2009
Though we focus on price regulation, this is not the only form of regulation for architects and construction
engineers in Germany. Entry as well as carrying the professional title “architect” or “engineer” is conditional
on having i) completed at least four years of studies and ii) at least two years of work experience plus iii)
on having registered as paid member in the German Chamber of Architects, a public institution. Only listed
professionals are entitled to submit their planning documents in order to obtain planning permissions from
German construction authorities. Moreover, to attain continued education is mandatory.2 The fact that these
regulations did not change in the period that we focus on, enables us to isolate the effect of the price increase
caused by the HOAI reform in 2009.
The German Fee Scale for Architects and Engineers (“Verordnung u¨ber die Honorare fu¨r Leistungen der
Architekten und der Ingenieure”, HOAI) is a federal ordinance to regulate the remuneration of services ren-
dered by architects and engineers operating in the construction sector.3 Based on the Law on the Regulation
of Services of Engineers and Architects, it is considered a binding price law for all planning and monitoring
services offered by architects and engineers. It has its roots already in 1871 when a non-binding recommen-
dation for fees was introduced. The economic policy in the National Socialist period favoured regulation
of economic activity and introduced price regulation for architects in 1935 which were adopted as binding
price ceilings for architects in 1950, while price recommendations for engineers remained unbinding. When
2Requirements to provide evidence of continued education vary across federal states.
3Our Online Appendix provides a more detailed description of the HOAI in Section A, including an example for the fee scale
in Table A2.
5
FIGURE 2
The HOAI Reform 2009 as Natural Experiment
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Notes: This figure plots the percentage change in prices relative to the previous quarter against time for the
years 2007 to 2012.
Source: Own calculations based the consumer price index provided by the German Federal Statistical Office.
the HOAI that today exists came into force in 1977, binding price floors were added and coverage was ex-
tended to construction engineers. In practice, if an architect or construction engineer posts a price below (or
above) the statutory price span on her website, this is a violation of the price regulation and simultaneously
an act of unfair competition (“German Act against Unfair Competition”) which is usually settled after warn-
ing letters with a declaration to cease and desist, but can lead to fines up to 250.000 e or up to two years of
incarceration.4
Since 1977 prices have been raised several times with the last revisions of the HOAI price schedule in
1996, 2009 and 20135. While the reform of 2009 had been initiated already in 1995 (see the “Bundesrats-
beschluss vom 06.06.1997” combined with its resolution five weeks later), it was not clear that it would
indeed result in a price increase, since even 10 years later when the grand coalition came into power in
2005, it was discussed whether to abolish the price regulation altogether (see Jochem and Kaufhold 2016).
A final draft of the reform had been proposed only in the End of April 2009 (see “Bundesrat Drucksache
4For instance, see verdicts of German regional high court Oldenburg in 2007 (1 W 39/07) and of German regional high court
Celle in 2009 (13 U 86/09).
5We do not focus on the 2013 price change, since our data is available only until 2012.
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395/09”) after a first draft from February 2008 was discussed. The amendment to the HOAI was announced
in June 2009 to be effective as of August 2009. Since there was only a very short time between the announce-
ment and the date of effectiveness, it is highly unlikely that behaviour has been adjusted in anticipation of
the concrete content of the reform. In the Online Appendix, we show that internet searches for keywords
related to the HOAI increased very shortly before the reform came into effect.
The reform in 2009 changed both price floors and ceilings of specific services provided by architects and
construction engineers for the 133,000 architects and 144,000 construction engineers in Germany (according
to official figures of the Federal Chamber of Engineers). The effect of the reform is clearly visible in
Figure 2, which shows the percentage change in the producer price index provided by the German Statistical
Office (based on the HOAI, construction statistics, national accounts and a survey of 143 offices) from 2007
to 2012. Strikingly, the binding price increase resulting from the HOAI reform immediately translated into
practice. The producer price index sharply increased in the third quarter of 2009 with an average price
increase of about 10% when the HOAI 2009 came into effect. For other engineers or providers of other
construction services, price growth fluctuated around a small positive value which shows that the reform
clearly did not influence the prices of our control group during the sample period.
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We employ data from the German microcensus, which is an official, representative annual household survey
comparable to the Current Population Survey in the United States. It covers approximately 830,000 individ-
uals in 370,000 households, which is 1% of all private households in Germany. Due to its mandatory nature,
the data guarantee a low rate of item non-response, which is a major advantage compared to other surveys.
This also ensures that our groups of interest, architects and engineers who comprise 3.2% of the working
population in Germany in 2011, are adequately represented.
This empirical analysis uses pooled cross-sectional data of the German microcensus for the years 2006
to 2012 covering the major HOAI reform in 2009. For our DD analyses, we restrict the sample to architects,
engineers in the construction sector and “all other engineers” with the latter forming our control group. We
further exclude individuals younger than 23 years, or older than 67 years as well as family workers support-
ing a family business. After these minor sample adjustments, we are left with around 35,000 observations
in total. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics broken down by employment and treatment status.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for all of our outcome variables. It shows the weighted averages
for each time period with “Pre” referring to the years 2006 to 2009 (before the HOAI 2009), and “Post” to
the years 2010 to 2012 (subject to HOAI 2009). The reported averages are weighted using survey weights
provided by the German microcensus.
7
TABLE 1
Outcomes and Controls by Treatment and Employment Status
Treatment group Control group
All Self-employed Employed All Self-employed Employed
Female 0.29 0.22 0.36 0.10 0.06 0.11
Married 0.86 0.78 0.92 0.84 0.69 0.86
German citizen 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.95 0.93
Age (in years) 43.82 47.71 39.81 43.25 49.20 42.74
Number of children 0.85 0.90 0.81 0.87 0.84 0.87
Lowest school degree 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03
Middle school degree 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.07
Highest school degree 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.90 0.90 0.90
Hours Worked 42.60 45.99 39.12 41.18 47.41 40.66
Net income very low 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03
Net income low 0.31 0.20 0.42 0.17 0.16 0.17
Net income mid 0.24 0.20 0.28 0.31 0.17 0.32
Net income high 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.26 0.18 0.27
Net income very high 0.12 0.20 0.05 0.17 0.28 0.16
Self-Employed (in %) 50.79 100.00 0.00 7.77 100.00 0.00
Firmsize 12.91 3.40 22.71 42.45 6.23 45.43
Cont. Education (in %) 32.69 33.43 31.93 33.37 24.78 34.09
Cont. Education (in hours) 16.70 17.35 16.03 19.88 15.76 20.23
Tenure (in years) 10.01 12.74 7.08 11.41 11.29 11.42
Observations 4,834 2,487 2,347 34,523 2,733 31,790
Notes: This table reports weighted averages for all of our outcome and control variables split by treatment and employ-
ment status. The treatment group consists of architects and construction engineers while the control group comprises “all
other engineers”. The numbers are weighted by survey weights provided by the microcensus.
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2006-2012)
A striking fact from Table 2 is that the share of self-employed architects is exceptionally high. In
the pre-reform period, 52.3% of all registered architects and construction engineers were self-employed.
This share decreases by 3 percentage points to 49.1% after the HOAI reform. In comparison, the self-
employment rate for other engineers—which form our control group—stays quite constant at a much lower
level of around 8%. Considering hours worked, architects and construction engineers apparently work 43
hours on average per week in the pre-treatment period, while this figure is a bit lower for the control group
(41 hours). On average, architectural and construction engineering firms are smaller as measured by the
number of employees than other firms. While the average firm counts around 42 employees, architects firms
consist of only 13 employees. Over the sample period, average firm size slightly increased for architects
and HOAI engineers, while it stayed almost constant for the control group. Finally, around one third of all
architects and engineers participated in continuing education programs and on-the-job training. Within a
year, architects received 18 hours of training in the time before the reform was introduced. This number
decreased to 15 hours after the HOAI reform.
Respondents are explicitly asked for their net income which includes salaries and wages, bonus pay-
ments like 13th month pay, business income, transfers like child allowances and unemployment benefits net
of taxes (that is wage tax, payroll tax and social security contributions) in the microcensus.
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TABLE 2
Outcome by Treatment Status and Reform Time
Treatment group Control group
Pre Post Pre Post
Professionals (per 1,000 working individuals) 3.23 3.54 24.14 24.52
Hours worked (in hours) 43.05 42.07 41.05 41.35
Net income very low 0.14 0.12 0.04 0.03
Net income low 0.32 0.30 0.19 0.15
Net income mid 0.23 0.25 0.31 0.31
Net income high 0.12 0.14 0.25 0.27
Net income very high 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.20
Self-employed (in %) 52.26 49.05 7.93 7.58
Firmsize 12.33 13.60 42.37 42.56
Cont. Education (in %) 32.83 32.53 33.42 33.30
Cont. Education (in hours) 18.12 15.01 19.55 20.30
Observations 2,625 2,209 19,392 15,131
Notes: This table reports weighted averages for all of our outcome variables split by treatment
status and reform time. The treatment group consists of architects and construction engineers
while the control group comprises all other engineers. “Pre” includes the years 2006 to 2009 and
“Post” refers to the years 2010 to 2012. All numbers are weighted by survey weights provided by
the microcensus.
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2006-2012)
This information is provided in income categories going from “below 150e” to “more than 18,000e”.
In total, there are 24 income bins in between such that the income information is sufficiently detailed. Except
for the descriptive statistics, we treat the income measure as a continuous variable (logarithmised). For the
former, we build the following five categories: very low income: income < 1300; low income: 1300 ≥
income < 2000; middle income: 2000≥ income < 2900; high income: 2900≥ income < 4000; very high
income: income > 4000. Unfortunately, gross income is not available in the dataset.
Our individual-level control variables include gender, marital status, an indicator of German citizenship,
number of children, education dummies, tenure and tenure squared (see Table 1). Except for gender, archi-
tects and engineers do not differ significantly in their baseline characteristics compared to control engineers
(columns “All”). On average, they are 44 years old. 86% are married and they have on average 0.9 children.
However, in both professions, women are strongly underrepresented. While the share of women among all
architects and construction engineers amounts to 30%, this share is 10% for all other engineers.
Figure B2 in the Online Appendix shows the personal net income distribution for architects and con-
struction engineers for the pre- and post-reform period for employees and for self-employed individuals,
respectively. The red (blue) vertical lines indicate the median, which is just below 2,500 Euro for both
before and after and for not self-employed and for self-employed. These figures show strikingly that the dis-
tribution of income is much more equal for self-employed than for none-self-employed: The highest bars of
the distribution of self-employed just exceed 20% of the population for self-employed, while the second bar
of low income earners make up well above 30% of the population for none-self-employed. Focusing on the
pre and post differences of the height of the bars, it appears that the lowest parts of the population decreased
and the fourth bar increased in both figures. This suggests that the reform could have moved individuals in
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higher income classes. However, Figure B3 demonstrates that at least some of the upward mobility was a
general effect, possibly due to the Great Recession of 2008/2009, since it shows that this can be observed
in the distribution of all working persons (except for architects and construction engineers) as well. A sec-
ond striking observation from these figures is that the distribution of income is much more unequal even for
self-employed for persons who are not architects or construction engineers. Moreover, the movements to
higher income classes seems to be not as concentrated as for the treatment group. This points to a positive
effect of the price regulation both on income and on the position in the income distribution.
But what does this mean for wages? The distribution of usual weekly hours worked (available on re-
quest) shows that some of the inequality in incomes is due to 10 extra hours that the median self-employed
works per week compared to her employee peers. This is a typical pattern that can be explained by pre-
cautionary labour supply (cf. Jessen et al. 2018). The reform effect on income, which is estimated below,
however, seems to translate directly to hourly wages, since there is hardly any change in labour supply
before and after the reform.
5. Empirical Methods and Results
We specify DD models of the following general form
E[yigt |1Treatedg ,1Postt ,Xigt ] = T (γ1Treatedg +ϑ1Postt +ω1Treatedg 1Postt +Xigtξ ), (1)
where T (zigt) is a transformation function, yigt is a measure of income, income inequality, or service
quality that varies across units i, group status g ∈ {Treated,Untreated}, and time t ∈ {Pre,Post}. 1Treatedg
is an indicator equal to 1 if a unit was treated, 1Postt is an indicator equal to 1 if an observation belongs to
the post reform period. Control variables indicating year, federal state, nationality, children, gender, marital
status, educational and vocational qualification, tenure and its square are included in the vector Xigt . γ , ϑ ,
and ω are coefficients to be estimated.
We define the time span from 2006 to 2009 as pre-treatment period and the time span from 2010 to
2012 as post-treatment period. In the main analysis with the German microcensus, we use individual-level
data and assign each individual to the treatment or control group based on the self-reported occupation and
industry branch of activity. For the analysis of the peer ranking data, we use country-level data with Ger-
many as treatment group and determine a synthetic control group with the method developed by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003). In the investigation of income and the peer ranking score, we use a linear transforma-
tion function where T (zit) = zit . For the analysis of the income distribution, we use a DD multinomial logit
model where T (zit) is a non-linear function.
Identification of the ATT depends on the absence of pre-treatment effects. If income, inequality or
quality measures are adjusted in anticipation of the reform, estimation of the ATT could be biased. In our
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application, this is unlikely to be the case, since although the amendment to the HOAI was announced
in 2005, violations of the price regulation were prosecuted until the amendment came into effect. In the
Online Appendix gives an overview of the timing of events and shows that internet searches for keywords
related to the HOAI remained low until shortly before the reform came into effect and dramatically increased
thereafter.
In addition, the causal effect for each individual must be stable in order to get an unbiased estimate. This
means in the case of architects that first, the amendment has the same effect on all architects, and second,
that the effect of the amendment to an individual is independent of the exposure of other individuals. While
the first requirement is met because the price regulation applies uniformly to all architects, the second
requirement could be violated if, e.g., an architect and an engineer who is not subject to the price regulation
contribute to the same household income as a married couple. Although we use information on individual
incomes, joint filing for married couples could result in a bias of the estimator.
Finally, we need to assume that the proportionality of trends of the outcome measures for treated and un-
treated that we observe pre-treatment would have been the same after the reform in absence of the treatment.
As a first check, Figure B1 in the Online Appendix plots the average of log income against time. The lines
move quite parallel up to 2008 where income seems to be quite constant. Then, there is a small increase in
the net income for both self-employed groups in 2009 (same parallel trend), but then the two dashed lines,
which represent the net income for self-employed, clearly go in different directions. While the time series
for self-employed other engineers slightly falls after 2009, the income for self-employed architects and con-
struction engineers keeps increasing a bit and then stays constant at a higher level (which is what we would
expect). As a second check, we also conducted an event study, which will be discussed in the next section.
5.1 Effects of Price Regulation on Income
The first question we answer is concerned with the enforcement of the price regulation and the use of the
price increases. If there is full enforcement, revenues must have increased by on average 10% all else equal.
Part of this extra revenue could have been used to increase the capital stock or hire more employees (see
Section 5.3). Since architects and engineers work with little non-human capital and few employees, profits
would increase by 10% if no extra costs were incurred. The business owner then could decide to split the
extra profits among her employees and take the residual as extra income. Whether the increased revenue is
shifted to the firms’ employees depends on the structure of the labour market. While wages (and thereby net
incomes given inelastic labour supply in the short run) would increase in a competitive labour market, this
would not happen if firm owners have some (local) monopsony power. In the latter case, we would expect
to see an increase in the firm owners’ income.
Table 3 shows estimates of the ATT obtained with a linear OLS model. The first column excludes
all employees from the sample and shows estimates for a model that includes only three variables and a
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constant: an indicator for the treatment group, the post policy period, and its interaction. The coefficient on
the interaction term ω is 9.7% which is statistically not different from the hypothesized 10% extra profits.
The coefficient on the treatment indicator shows that architects and construction engineers earn on average
about 22% less than engineers in the control group. This reduces to 14.5% with the inclusion of control
variables.
TABLE 3
Effects of Regulation on Income for Architects and Engineers
I II III IV V VI VII
Sample Self-Employed Self-Employed Employees All Self-Employed Employees All
Treated × Post 0.097∗∗ 0.080∗ 0.005 0.010
(0.048) (0.044) (0.021) (0.019)
Treated -0.219∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.029) (0.015) (0.013) (0.060) (0.029) (0.028)
Post 0.007 -0.075 0.064∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.046) (0.008) (0.010)
Regulated × Placebo Post -0.003 -0.080∗ -0.040
(0.081) (0.042) (0.039)
Placebo Post 0.007 0.002 0.003
(0.055) (0.009) (0.009)
Year Indicators X X X X X X
State Indicators X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
Observations 4,092 4,092 29,275 33,367 1,180 7,897 9,077
Adjusted R2 (%) 1.5 18.3 33.1 28.6 22.4 31.5 27.7
Estimation Equation: DD estimated using OLS.
Control variables: Indicators of year, federal state, nationality, children, gender, marital status, educational and vocational qualification,
tenure and its square.
Inference: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2006-2012).
In column II, when we include our set of control variables, the estimate for the ATT is more precise
(since the standard error decreased somewhat), but smaller. The point estimate indicates that of the 10.0%
potential extra profits only 8.0% arrived in the business owners pockets. This means that 2.0% of the extra
profits could have ended up somewhere else, though an effect of 10.0% is within the 95%-confidence bands.
Therefore, we reestimate the specification from column II for employees only. The results are presented
in column III. The quite precise estimate of the ATT is insignificantly different from zero, which indicates
that, on average, employees did not receive any share of the extra profits. Please note that since we have to
use net income as dependent variable, it is likely that the 2% reflect tax liabilities or contributions. Column
IV shows that the overall effect is dominated by employees. This is no surprise since their share in the
population is seven times higher than the share of self-employed.
In column V, we conduct a placebo experiment where we pretend that the reform occurred in 2008 using
only data from 2007 and 2008 to make sure that the pre and post policy periods have similar numbers of
observations. Since the reform was to some extent designed to catch-up with the general price development,
12
FIGURE 3
Event Studies for Net Income
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Notes: The two figures present event studies for net income. The left graph plots the coefficient and the 96%-confidence
band of the interaction terms of the treated dummy and the respective year dummy. The left graph shows the results for
self-employed individuals and the right graph plots the effects for employees only. In both graphs, the coefficient on
the year 2009 serves as a baseline effect.
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2006-2012).
persons working under regulated prices could have responded to this pressure before 2009. These kind
of anticipation effects could lead to violation of the assumption that the 2009 fee revision resembles an
exogenous experiment. The estimate on the interaction term shows that this is not the case. In line with our
assumption it is small and insignificant.
The results from the event studies are shown in Figure 3. The left graph plots the coefficients and the
96% confidence bands for the self-employed while the right graphs does the same for employees only. Given
that the sample of self-employed within our time frame is only about 5,000 individuals, the confidence bands
are quite large when compared to the analogous regression for the employed individuals. This also renders
the single coefficients insignificant, but nevertheless, it is nice to see that all coefficients after 2009 are
positive suggesting that the reform had the positive effect on the business’ owners incomes. Although the
coefficient in 2006 is also positive, we think that it is important to note that for 2007 and 2008, the point
estimates are almost exactly at zero which speaks in favour of the common-trends assumption.
5.2 Effects of Price Regulation on Income Inequality
For the investigation of the effect of price regulation on income inequality, we follow novel strategies by ap-
plying the DD model in a multinomial framework: First, we divide the income distribution of self-employed
with positive personal net income into quintiles J and estimate multinomial logit models with maximum
likelihood, where
T (zi jt) = Pi jt(zi jt) = exp(zi jt)/
(
1+
J
∑
j=1
zi jt
)
.
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We normalize the middle income class to serve as base category. The log-likelihood function is
logL =
N
∑
i=1
J
∑
j=1
logPi jt(zi jt).
From this we calculate the treatment effect and obtain standard errors using the delta method.
The ATT at the time of treatment conditional on Xi,1,1 is
E j[yfactuali11 |1,1,Xi11]−E j[ycounterfactuali,1,1 |1,1,Xi11]
= Pi jt(γ j +ϑ j +ω j +Xi11ξ j)−Pi jt(γ j +ϑ j +Xi11ξ j). (2)
The five estimates for the ATTs are reported in Table 4 for three standard DD models. The first model is
based on the sample of self-employed architects and engineers but includes no control variables, while the
second model does. The third model uses the sample of all architects and engineers.
The findings are consistent with the results of the previous subsection: In all three models the reform
effect for the second and third quintile is negative and economically important. For instance, model I indi-
cates that the probability of belonging to the second quintile of the income distribution is about 4 percentage
points smaller. For the other models, the reform effect is of similar size but often imprecisely measured.
Where do these self-employed go? The first two models suggest that the probability of belonging to
the upper 20% and upper 40% of the income distribution increased due to the reform. Although statistical
significance cannot be achieved at the 10% level, the changes in probabilities are sizable: the probability to
have moved to the highest quintile increased by again about 4 percentage points. The results from model III,
where all architects and engineers are considered, suggests that the reform was effective mainly for a shift
from the second lowest or middle to the second highest quintile. A reason for this could be that there may be
high income architects or engineers working as employees who earn more than the average self-employed.
In a next step, we estimate the model coefficients using only pre-treatment information on the treatment
group but the full time span for the control group. Then, we predict outcomes out of sample, i.e. the post-
treatment period, for the treated group. We contrast the actual income class probabilities with the predicted
to obtain the ATT using t-tests. This method is equivalent to the standard DD approach with a large number
of cross-sectional observations but much easier to calculate in nonlinear models. To improve prediction, we
include a quadratic time trend instead of year indicators.
The results are similar to the previous ones. Self-employed architects and engineers move from the
second lowest quintile straight up to the highest quintile. These effects are economically and statistically
significant (see last two rows in Table 4). This shows that the reform had a substantial effect on the income
distribution. In fact, since architects and engineers earn on average a higher income than the rest of the
working population, and self-employed move up the income distribution due to the reform, we conclude
that price regulation is a determinant of income inequality in general.
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TABLE 4
Effects of Regulation on Income Inequality for Architects and Engineers
Model I: No Controls, Sample: Self-Employed
Quintiles Lowest 20% Second Lowest 20% Mid 20% Second Highest 20% Highest 20%
Average Effect of Reform (%) 0.8 -4.1∗ -1.9 1.1 4.1
(1.4) (2.3) (1.8) (2.1) (2.8)
Model II: Full Set of Controls, Sample: Self-Employed
Quintiles Lowest 20% Second Lowest 20% Mid 20% Second Highest 20% Highest 20%
Average Effect of Reform (%) -0.1 -5.1 -0.7 1.5 4.4
(1.2) (3.0) (1.7) (2.1) (3.2)
Model III: Full Set of Controls, Sample: All
Quintiles Lowest 20% Second Lowest 20% Mid 20% Second Highest 20% Highest 20%
Average Effect of Reform (%) 0.7 -1.1 -0.8 3.1∗∗∗ -2.0
(0.6) (1.1) (1.0) (1.4) (1.6)
Model IV: Full Set of Controls, Sample: Self-Employed, Fitted with Treated Before Only
Quintiles Lowest 20% Second Lowest 20% Mid 20% Second Highest 20% Highest 20%
Observed Probabilities (%) 8.5 13.3 8.7 18.1 51.4
After Reform (27.9) (34.0) (28.2) (38.5) (50.0)
Predicted Probabilities (%) 6.7 17.4 9.4 16.6 50.0
Without Reform (5.9) (12.7) (6.1) (6.9) (17.9)
Difference (%) -0.1 -4.5∗∗∗ -0.8 1.6 3.8∗∗∗
Estimation: Results from multinomial logit models estimated with maximum likelihood.
Sample: (Self-employed) architects, construction engineers and unregulated engineers.
Control variables: Indicators of year or linear time trend, federal state, nationality, children, gender, marital status, educa-
tional and vocational qualification, tenure and its square.
Inference: (Delta-method) standard errors or standard deviations are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2006-2012).
5.3 Effects of Price Regulation on Further Labour Market Outcomes
Table 5 reports the results for our linear DD models for further labour market outcomes including the number
of hours worked (columns I and II), the propensity to be self-employed (III), firm size measured by the
number of employees (IV), the propensity to engage in continued education programs (V), and the number
of training hours (VI). Since the number of employees is censored at 10, we report results from a tobit
regression in column IV with self-employment as additional control variable.
The results confirm the descriptive evidence that hours worked did not change in response to the re-
form. In addition, we find a negative and slightly statistically significant effect on the propensity to be
self-employed. However, the reform led to a significant increase in the number of employees per firm. The
point estimate of 1.1 (using a Tobit model for this regression due to censoring) suggests that average firm
size has increased by 1.1 employees, which is an increase by around 8%. Thus, the price increase induced
by the HOAI had a clear market structure effect resulting in fewer, but larger firms.
In columns V and VI, we investigate whether the reform had a causal impact on on-the-job training,
which might serve as a first indication for service quality. While there is no effect on the propensity to enrol
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in continued education, we find a negative effect at the intensive margin. Those engaging in these programs
reduce their training by around five hours per year. However, it would be misleading to attribute this effect
entirely to the 2009 amendment to the HOAI. The reason is that the so-called “Engineering Card”, which
increased the value of education for our control group, was introduced in 2010 in Germany. This makes it
very difficult to distinguish the reform effects. Thus, the large decrease in hours of continued training in
Table 5 cannot be interpreted as evidence for a decrease in service quality.
TABLE 5
Effects of Regulation on Labour Market and Quality Outcomes
I II III IV V VI
Dep. Variable Hours Worked Hours Worked Self-Employed Firm Size Cont. Educ (y/n) Cont. Educ (h)
Sample Self-employed Employees All All All All
Treated × Post 0.018 -0.510 -0.028∗ 1.095∗∗ -0.003 -5.005∗∗
(0.774) (0.341) (0.015) (0.544) (0.016) (2.279)
Treated 0.667 1.075∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ -28.738∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.437
(0.515) (0.243) (0.011) (0.371) (0.011) (1.786)
Post -1.166 0.036 -0.003 -0.878∗∗ 0.009 1.706
(0.840) (0.154) (0.007) (0.357) (0.011) (1.861)
Year Indicators X X X X X X
State Indicators X X X X X X
Other Controls X X X X X X
Observations 4,521 30,615 35,157 34,933 35,154 35,006
Estimation: Results from DD models estimated with OLS.
Sample: Architects, construction engineers and unregulated engineers.
Control variables: Indicators of year, federal state, nationality, children, gender, marital status, hours worked, educational
and vocational qualification, tenure and its square. Column IV: indicator for self-employment.
Inference: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, significance levels are ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2006-2012).
Finally, we conducted an extensive set of robustness tests for all of our regressions. First, to tackle the
concern that 2009 might be confounded as this year is half treated and half untreated, we dropped 2009
as a pre-reform year. As can be also seen in the Online Appendix (see Tables B1 and B2), our results
remain virtually the same both qualitatively and quantitatively after the exclusion of 2009 though the fewer
observations leave us with less precise estimates. Second, in Tables B3 and B4, we dropped all individuals
younger than 30 to exclude the possibility that our results are confounded by the entry of new and young
professionals due to the higher income (given the full pass-through that we observe). Again, this does
not change our results at all. Third, we tested whether the results are driven by one of our two treatment
occupations. For most of our outcomes, we do not find any evidence that one occupation is driving the
results. The only exceptions are self-employment status (significant at the 10% level for architects) and
firmsize (significant at the 5% level for construction engineers), see Tables B5 and B6. Finally, we used
two other occupations, namely i) tax consultants and ii) lawyers and notaries, as control groups which have
a similar high prevalence of self-employment. While for most outcomes the point coefficients go into the
same direction, there seems to be a difference, e.g., in hours worked and firm size. The exact results can be
found in Tables B7 and B8.
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5.4 Effects of Price Regulation on Service Quality
To analyse the effect of price regulation on service quality, we employ a novel, country-level data set, which
is able to measure architectural quality from a comprehensive perspective, including aesthetic quality. More
precisely, we use the score of an office ranking from 2006 to 2012 published every second month by BauNetz
Media GmbH on its website. The ranking is based on the number, length and level of detail of publications
made within the previous 24 months in professional journals. The number of pages of a report is converted
into a score, where a one page illustrated note equals one point, a two page short presentation two points, a
three to four pages small report three points, a regular report of five to seven pages four points, and a large
report of eight or more pages gives five points. The final score per office is the weighted sum of points,
where the weighting factor depends on the information density of the respective journals. An even more
detailed description of the calculation method (which is conducted by the BauNetz Media GmbH itself) is
given in the Online Appendix. Germany has an average peer ranking score of 8 and scores much lower than,
for example, the EU average of about 14. However, if we account for outlier offices by dropping the lowest
and highest 1% of the score distribution for each country, this differences shrinks to around 3 score points.
For our analysis, we aggregate the office data to the national level, which gives us a country-level balanced
panel.
To estimate the causal reform effect, we employ the SCM, first proposed in Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003). The SCM is an extension to the standard DD estimator. Instead of relying on one distinct control
group, this method constructs a synthetic counterfactual group, which is computed as a weighted average of
all possible control units, denoted by C. Assuming a linear factor model, the estimator for the ATT for each
post-treatment year t is given by
ωˆ∗t = yGermany,t −
C
∑
c=1
w∗cyct for t > 2009, (3)
which is, under certain conditions, an unbiased estimator of the treatment effect of the reform (see
Abadie et al., 2010). yGermany,t denotes the observed outcome for Germany. The counterfactual outcome
is given by a weighted average of the control units C, serving as the counterfactual outcome in absence of
treatment. The vector W ∗ ≡ (w1, . . . ,wC)′ is chosen to minimize the distance ‖XGermany−X0W‖, where X
is a matrix containing the covariates and (linear combinations) of pre-intervention outcomes. Intuitively,
by matching on observed covariates as well as pre-intervention outcomes, this method aims at controlling
for time-varying unobservables. For the analysis below, X includes the following covariates: architects
to population ratio, population, GDP per capita, market size and government expenditure. In addition,
yearly averages for the years 2006-2009 enter the estimation as 4 distinct linear combinations of our pre-
intervention outcomes.
Figure 4a presents the results of the SCM. It depicts the time series of the score points for Germany
(solid line) and its synthetic twin (dashed line). The latter results from a double maximisation procedure
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Effects of Regulation on Quality
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Notes: The left graph plots the time series from January 2006 (time 1) to January 2012 of the quality
score for Germany and the synthetic control group (“Synthetic Germany”). It consists of 6.9% of
Croatia, 34.4% of France, 3.1% of Italy, 23.7% of Spain, 4.2% of Switzerland and 27.7% of Turkey.
In the right graph, the SCM analysis is conducted without the “potentially polluted” year 2009. Here,
the synthetic unit is made up of 51% France, 27.6% Turkey and 21.4% UK.
Source: BauNetz Media GmbH: Office-Ranking (2006-2012). Own Calculations.
and consists of 6.9% of Croatia, 34.4% of France, 3.1% of Italy, 23.7% of Spain, 4.2% of Switzerland and
27.7% of Turkey. Thus, France, Spain and Turkey are the main ingredients of the synthetic control group.
Figure 4a clearly shows two things. First, the SCM has produced a control group which is able to repro-
duce the trajectory of Germany quite well, as can be seen from the almost perfect fit in the pre-intervention
period indicated by the vertical red line. Second, after the exogenous price increase, the two time series di-
verge. At least after around one year after the reform, there is a clear negative treatment effect: while the
score for the synthetic control group is increasing over time indicating a positive time trend in scores, Ger-
many experiences a decrease. Pinned down in quantitative terms, the average point estimate amounts to -2
score points, which would translate into a percentage effect of -18%. Figure 4b shows the results when we
leave out 2009 in the analysis as this year might be polluted due to the specific lagged calculation of the
score. Although we thereby loose one year of pre-treatment fit, there is a clear widening of the gap visible
after the introduction of the HOAI. Given the 24 months lag of the score, the results seem to be even more
plausible as the reform fully kicks in after 24 months.
To assess the statistical significance of the effect, we rely on three standard techniques in the SCM
literature, whose results are illustrated in Figure 5. The left upper graph shows the result of placebo-in-
space regressions where the treatment status is reassigned to each country J in the pool of control units.
Germany, indicated by the thick black line, lies at the outer region of the placebo funnel, which hints at
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FIGURE 5
Effects of Regulation on Quality: Inference
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Notes: Figure 5a shows the results of the placebo-in-space studies, where treatment is reassigned to
all units in the donor pool. The thick black line denotes Germany. Figure 5b plots the frequency
distribution of the RMSPE-ratio. The two bottom graphs show the results of the placebos-in-time
where we pretend the treatment to have taken place in 2007 and 2008.
Source: BauNetz Media GmbH: Office-Ranking (2006-2012). Own Calculations.
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a statistically significant reform effect. To account for the fact that the pre-intervention fit of the placebo
effects highly differs, Figure 5b plots the distribution of the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE)
ratio which relates the post-intervention RMSPE to the pre-intervention RMSPE. Compared to the placebos-
in-space, this ratio accounts for bad pre-intervention fits. Germany has the largest ratio, which would again
suggest that the estimated treatment effect is statistically significant. Finally, we conduct two placebo-in-
time tests (shown in Figures 5c and 5d) where we pretend the treatment to have taken place in 2007 and 2008
respectively. Reassuringly, there is no divergence of the lines up to the year 2009 in both cases, suggesting
that there is no effect in the pre-intervention period.
Concluding this part, our analysis delivers some first evidence that the HOAI with its sharp price increase
did not lead to an increase of quality of architectural services—rather the opposite. Of course, one has to
account for the fact, that this ranking, while it serves as a flagship signalling device for architectural quality,
is selective, since only slightly more than 1% of all offices in Germany are included. In addition, due to the
inherent nature of the ranking, there might be a two-year transition phase after the reform, as publications
count in the score for exactly two years. Moreover, the quality response could have evolved non-linearly
over time with an immediate response to restore profit margins and later output adjustments. Even with
these caveats, our evidence from the office ranking is an important step for the analysis of regulation, since
it shows how to make use of a measure that goes beyond “objective” quality measures (like, for example,
the number and sum of building damages) and is actually used by the professionals themselves in practice
to asses service quality.
6. Conclusion
In addition to occupational licensing, prices in professions that provide experience or credence goods are
often regulated by law to guarantee a minimum standard of quality. At the same time, such product mar-
ket regulation may have unintended effects on labour market outcomes with the degree of income inequality
being of special interest to the general public. We provide first evidence on the association between in-
come inequality and service quality from a natural experiment to shed light on the question whether price
regulation introduces an additional trade-off between quality and inequality.
We study the case of exogenous increases of fixed prices for architects and construction engineers in
Germany. We find that incomes of self-employed architects and construction engineers increased signifi-
cantly by 8% and for employees by 0%. This implies that the full share of the price hike ended up in the
business owners’ pockets and that there is no evidence that any part of the extra profits affected employees’
incomes. In addition, our results indicate that the probability to belong to the second lowest 20% and the
mid 20% of the personal net income distribution decreased due to the reform by about 5 percentage points,
while the probability to stay in the second highest and highest 20% increased correspondingly. Finally, we
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show how service quality changed due to the reform. Using a well-known office ranking, we find that the
exogenous price increase did not have the expected positive quality effects. In contrast, the reform seems to
have a slightly negative effect on service quality with a significant decrease of two score points within that
ranking.
This suggests that there is no additional trade-off between quality and inequality. There results rather
show that price regulation may lead to a deterioration of service quality and at the same time be beneficial
for those at the higher end of the income distribution. Although we use indicators for quality from the
best two data sources available, these measures are not perfect. Therefore, we encourage researchers and
practitioners to make better measures of quality available for future research.
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